HKUST(GZ) Computational Media Arts |
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| Resource type: Conference Paper Language: en: English Peer reviewed BibTeX citation key: GrimshawAagaard2026 Email resource to friend View all bibliographic details |
Categories: General Keywords: Artificial creativity, Artificial Intelligence, Embodied cognition Creators: Bie, Grimshaw-Aagaard Publisher: Nagoya University (Japan) Collection: Society for Phenomenology and Media |
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| Attachments | URLs https://www.societ ... dmedia.org/cfp2026 |
| Abstract |
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"In this polemic, we speculatively explore the phenomenology of Artificial Intelligence (AI), specifically Artificial General Intelligence (AGI), and claims for its embodiment. Pace the market-driven, techno-optimism espoused by the AI industry, we have taken a more cynical view in recent work, arguing that there is no such thing as being an AI, that AI can have no subjective consciousness as we are able to know it, and that the only experience an AI has can best be described as a received phenomenology drawn from a limited pool of generalised human knowledge about the world. In pursuing these themes further, we make a rigorous distinction between the "lived body" or body-as-subject (Leib) and the "constructed body” or body-as-object (Körper). We use this distinction to argue against current conceptions of embodiment within the AI field while suggesting ways forward to an AGI that is truly embodied in the strict phenomenological sense."
Added by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard Last edited by: Mark Grimshaw-Aagaard |